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Preface
Hundreds or even thousands of international legal instruments on "the environment"
are in existence.  What happens to international environmental agreements once they
are signed, and how does the process of implementing such agreements influence their
effectiveness?  These are the questions that motivate the IIASA project
"Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments
(IEC)".  Research teams are examining these questions from many angles and with
different methods.
In this paper, David Victor, John Lanchbery, and Owen Greene describe an effort
underway to compile information on the implementation review mechanisms (IRMs)
operating in a large sample of international environmental agreements.  Such
mechanisms allow the parties and others to verify the extent to which another party is
complying with an agreement and offer a venue to handle problems, for example, of
poor performance or noncompliance.  They can make agreements more effective by
keeping the international bargain connected to the reality of what states can implement. 
Consequently, building more effective IRMs could be a major way that policy-makers
could improve the effectiveness of international environmental agreements.
The authors describe a data protocol that they are using, with others in the IEC
project, to build a database of the major variables related to the operation of IRMs. 
Using the protocol, they have now coded several dozen cases; some initial observations
and research questions that stem from "working with the data" are presented here.  
The IEC research project is now sponsoring several historical and comparative case
studies on the functioning of IRMs.  This paper, along with another paper that surveys
the same issues but from a theoretical rather than empirical perspective, lays a
foundation for our research program on IRMs.  Because it organizes the relevant data in
a systematic fashion, the database described here has also been used to help select cases
for IEC’s in-depth case-study research on IRMs.
vThe context of this paper in the IEC project
This paper is one of several IEC working papers that survey the existing literature,
place the project in a framework of prior research, and identify the major questions that
deserve further study.  At the outset, members of the project decided to prepare these
papers to ensure that we were adequately aware of other research in the field and,
especially, to ensure that we would be studying the most important questions in the
proper context.  The papers that play these roles are listed below, divided into each of
the three areas of IEC’s research program.  Fuller descriptions of different parts of
IEC’s research program are available in the IEC project description (copies available
from IEC) and in the prefaces and working papers listed below.
1. Historical case-study and comparative research
Most of IEC’s research is directed at studying how international
environmental agreements have been implemented historically through
examination of case-studies and focussed comparisons among selected cases. 
Teams are studying domestic implementation as well as international and
transnational processes.  Eight papers review the relevant literature and
establish the context and research questions:
  Research on implementation at the domestic level in Western Europe and
in the Eastern economies undergoing transformation:
  o Steinar Andresen, Jon Birger Skjærseth, and Jørgen Wettestad,
1994, "Regime, the State and Society--Analysing the
Implementation of International Environmental Commitments".
  o Vladimir Kotov, 1994, "Implementation and Effectiveness of
International Environmental Regimes During the Process of
Economic Transformation in Russia".
  o Elena Nikitina, 1994, "Domestic Implementation of International
Environmental Commitments: a Review of Soviet Literature".
  o Alexei Roginko, 1994, "Domestic Compliance with International
Environmental Agreements: a Review of Current Literature".
Research on international and transnational processes of implementation:
  o David G. Victor with Owen J. Greene, John Lanchbery, Juan Carlos
di Primio and Anna Korula, 1994, "Roles of Review Mechanisms in
the Effective Implementation of International Environmental
Agreements".  
  o David G. Victor, John Lanchbery and Owen Greene, 1994, "An
Empirical Study of Review Mechanisms: Report on Work in
Progress".
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  o David G. Victor with Anna Korula, 1994, "What Is an International
Environmental Agreement?"
  o Owen J. Greene, 1994, "On Verifiability, and How It Could Matter
for International Environmental Agreements".
2. Development of a database
IEC is developing a database that will consist of key variables related to the
development and effective implementation of international agreements.  It will
allow systematic use of historical evidence from a large number of cases.  The
goal is to make possible the testing of hypotheses and the drawing of general
conclusions about which variables are causally linked to "effectiveness".  One
paper reviews the major hypotheses related to the formation and effectiveness
of international regimes:
  o Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and Michael Zürn, 1994, "The Study
of International Regimes".
3. Other research and policy activities
IEC researchers are applying their research findings to current and future
policy issues as opportunities arise.  The project is also sponsoring a major
simulation-gaming exercise to explore issues of institutional design,
implementation and compliance in international environmental agreements. 
Simulations can help promote creative thinking about political options for
international management of climate change, identify potential pitfalls,
integrate policy-relevant knowledge from a variety of domains, and identify
important policy-relevant knowledge needs.  One paper surveys the benefits of
using simulation-gaming as a policy and research tool:
  o Edward A. Parson, 1995, "Why Study Hard Policy Problems With
Simulation-Gaming?"
The above list includes only the papers that the project has used in establishing the
framework for its research activities.  A complete list of publications and copies of
papers are available from the IEC offices at IIASA.
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Abstract
This report is part of a large scale comparison of how implementation review
mechanisms (IRMs) are used in international environmental agreements.  Broadly,
IRMs are the means by which data is exchanged and gathered, reviewed and assessed in
the context of an international agreement, and by which problems of compliance and
inadequate performance are managed.  Here we describe the data protocol that is being
used in assembing a database of review mechanisms and explain the rationale behind all
the major questions in the protocol.  The protocol consists of questions about the
general features of agreements as well as more focussed questions concerning: how
information relating to national performance and compliance is gathered and
disseminated; how that information is assessed; and the means by which the parties and
the agreement respond to potential problems of noncompliance and inadequate
performance.
The database is useful in part because it organizes information about different
international environmental agreements into a comparable format and thus aids in the
selection of appropriate cases and comparisons for further research.  It is also useful
because it can aid in the testing of hypotheses about which aspects of international
agreements and review mechanisms lead agreements to be more effective.  We are now
using it for both purposes, in addition to extending the number of cases in the database.
To date, over fifty cases have been coded using the protocol.  Here we also report
some observations and hypotheses derived from working with the data from those
cases.  These include:  1) a hypothesis that review mechanisms tend to grow as needed
to fulfill demand for specific functions;  2) a hypothesis that review mechanisms might
help the parties to an agreement address various forms of complexity that arise in
negotiating and managing international agreements; 3) a questions as to whether and
how often institutions that are formally outside a particular agreement but with
competence or power in the issue-area de facto provide the review mechanisms for the
agreement; 4) a question as to whether review mechanisms make their largest
contribution to effectiveness when the obligations of an agreement are precise or vague;
5) a question as to whether in practice some of the functions of review mechanisms are
performed by dispute resolution mechanisms, which tend to be formally created in most
international agreements (but appear to be rarely used in environmental agreements).
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1An Empirical Study of Review Mechanisms in Environmental Regimes
Report on work in Progress
David Victor, John Lanchbery and Owen Greene1
I. Introduction
International agreements often establish procedures for reviewing parties’
performance. Scholars have given many names to these--for example, surveillance,
enforcement, or performance review mechanisms. Here we title them broadly as
"Implementation Review Mechanisms" (IRMs), intending to encompass in that phrase
all of those procedures for review that have been established within international
agreements. 
IRMs may be of great importance in promoting the effective domestic
implementation of international environmental agreements; the many pathways by
which they can contribute to the effectiveness of international environmental
agreements has been discussed elsewhere (Victor et al., 1994).  Their utility has been
well demonstrated in subjects such as arms control, trade, economic performance, and
human rights.  
A systematic understanding of the role of IRMs is a major component of the IIASA
project, "Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental
Commitments (IEC)".  One important part of that systematic study--a useful prelude to
any other research--is to capture in an extensive database the experience to date of
existing review mechanisms that have been formally established within international
agreements. This essay reports on the structure, rationale, and initial results of a major
effort undertaken by the project to build such a database. 
We have limited ourselves, for this initial purpose, to formally-established IRMs,
that is, those that have been spelled out in formal texts, either in an original agreement,
or at a subsequent time. We recognize, of course, that there are also many informally
established review mechanisms, but the delimitation is necessary at the start to compile
efficiently a substantial database. So far, we have coded over 50 international
     
1With substantial input to the discussions from Juan Carlos di Primio and Anna
Korula.
2environmental agreements--a representative sample selected from a universe of possible
cases that currently number about 175; the work is continuing.
This database effort is intended to serve two primary purposes: 1) to highlight
important research questions that emerge when examining a large number of
agreements in detail rather than just the handful that are most studied by scholars.  The
penultimate section of this paper highlights five major questions that have come from
"working with the data". In this capacity, this paper complements the research agenda
suggested in Victor et al. (1994), the theoretical paper written in parallel with this
empirical study.  For a view of the theoretical and empirical context of IEC’s research
into IRMs, the two papers should be read together.  Readers should also note that the
theoretical paper has an annex on the design characteristics of IRMs, intended to apply
some of the theoretical questions raised in the paper to the practical policy-oriented
issue of design choices faced by policymakers when they construct IRMs.  The present
essay looks at that question from the opposition angle: at the choices that have been
made and the ways that they may influence the effectiveness of the IRM.  2) This
structured study of the key variables related to the operation and effectiveness of IRMs
is intended to identify variance in those variables.  That variance is then used in later,
more detailed studies, to choose cases that are useful in answering focussed questions. 
Indeed, a broad database such as this one can not provide definitive answers to most
questions about the operation of IRMs, but it can help avoid the problem in much social
science research that cases are not selected scientifically.
The second purpose is the more important of the two, and the database now forms a
growing resource by which the IIASA project on Implementation and Effectiveness of
Environmental Commitments (and others) can review the existence and procedures for
IRMs in a structured way, across a large number of agreements.
II. Database Structure
We have developed a protocol which we use to structure the data collection process. 
The logic of a common data protocol is simply that it forces the analyst to organize data
in a manner that promotes comparability.  Annex I of this essay reproduces the data
protocol in the form of a template.  Each field of data is shown in bold typeface; the
type of data requested, explanations and options are shown in light typeface. The actual
database, which IEC maintains at IIASA, consists of one file (Wordperfect 5.1/5.2
format) per case; each file is a copy of the template, with the light typeface explanations
removed and each field filled in with the appropriate information.
Currently the database is available only in this multiple file format.  We are still
building the full data set, and the main purpose has been to identify cases for further
detailed study.  However, we plan an integration of the data into a common single (or
3linked) file structure, perhaps as part of the database activities in the larger project
under way at IIASA (for a description of that project see IEC, 1994; for a description of
the database effort see Levy et al., 1994).  A version accessible via the Internet,
probably with a Mosaic reader, is foreseen.2  
III. Data Protocol
The data protocol reprinted in Annex I requests four types of information:  1)
general information about each case; 2) information about Implementation Review
Mechanisms that may be operative in each case; 3) sources used in coding the case and
for further reading; and, 4) comments.  The bulk of the information is in categories 1
and 2, and we will focus on those here.  However, category 3 will point the reader to
additional sources of information and, especially, to the formal reports and documents
that were used for coding the case (see section below "Sources of Information for
Coding").  Category 4 reports any comments--we include this because a major benefit
of working through so many cases, especially less well-known agreements, is that many
observations about possible research questions and interesting design features have
arisen.  This category is where those can be noted.  
The data protocol described here is version 3 and has been developed through two
major revisions, each resulting from discussions amongst the authors about the key
variables and, crucially, from testing earlier versions on actual cases.  Development of
the protocol took place over a three month period beginning November, 1993; the bulk
of the coding reported here was done (and revised) between December, 1993, and July,
1994.
Field-by-field description of the variables is included in Annex II; here we provide
only a very brief overview.
General Information
We have coded for a large amount of general information about each case,
primarily because some key factors are essential background when interpreting and
comparing cases--it is crucial to control for variables that may influence the outcomes
and effectiveness of the different agreements so that, as much as possible, we can
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4observe the independent influence of the IRM.  Controlling for variables is a perennial
problem in the social sciences, especially when dealing with cases that are complex and
where cause and effect are linked in complex and poorly understood ways.  Thus, here
we report on the major control variables.
In addition, the general information field includes other background information,
such as the city of adoption and the dates of significant changes, which is of general
help in understanding the evolution of the agreement.  We include contact information
for the secretariat because in many cases we have obtained documents from the
secretariat, and for cases that will be subjected to further investigation, the secretariat is
a logical starting point for information gathering.
Information on Implementation Review Mechanisms
The bulk of our attention is given to coding information on the IRMs themselves,
and what we have found is that few agreements actually adopt a fully developed set of
review functions.  Rather, most have procedures that could evolve into an IRM (or parts
of an IRM), and we suspect that IRM functions are, in some cases, performed by
competent organizations not formally attached to the agreement (e.g., the OECD or the
EU in agreements where the commitments overlap with areas where those organizations
have competence).  These claims suggest hypotheses to be investigated, and we explore
some later in this essay (see "Initial Observations").
We are interested in two aspects of IRMs:  first, how information enters the IRM
process; and, second, how that information is reviewed, evaluated and utilized (and who
can participate in or influence the review).  Our data protocol follows this division.  In
both aspects of the study we have developed a matrix that organizes the information; in
the data protocol, each box of the matrix is represented by one data field.  The two
matrices are shown in Annex II as figures 1 and 2.
IV. Sources of Information for Coding in the Database
Primarily this is a survey of international environmental agreements drawn from the
standard source, the UNEP Register of treaties (Rummel-Bulska and Osafo, 1991 and
Kiss, 1983).  However, clearly there are many questions about what actually is a case:
i.e., "What is an International Environmental Agreement?".  We have addressed that
issue at length elsewhere (see Victor with Korula, 1994) and will not cover those issues
here, except to note that there is no single definition that applies in all circumstances. 
Our longer discussion reviews the implications of alternative definitions, and in this
early effort reported in this essay we have focussed primarily on "hard law"--i.e.,
legally binding treaties that comprise the core of international environmental law.  By
5UNEP’s estimates that is about 132 agreements.  We have adjusted that slightly and are
now working with a universe of cases that currently number 175 (Victor with Korula,
1994, table 1).  
Annex III lists the cases we have coded to date.  It is a representative sample
covering all the major issue areas, single- as well as multiple-issues; young as well as
older treaties; regional and global arrangements; soft as well as hard law; active and
moribund treaties.  
The most important aspect of our data sources is that in order to keep this database
effort manageable we have limited the data sources to formal documents.  In all cases
we begin the coding with the legal instrument (i.e., treaty or soft law declarations,
guidelines, etc.) and then in most cases have expanded with formal reports of meetings,
background papers from secretariats and other "official" documents.  In many cases we
also cite secondary sources--such as the Green Globe Yearbook (1991 - 94)--which we
have used only to extract formal information. 
Limiting our database to formal sources of information has two important
consequences, both of which restrict the extent to which we can draw robust
conclusions from the effort without further more detailed research.  (And in both cases
we are engaged in such further research to avoid these limitations.)  First, even under
hard law regimes, the review mechanism might operate informally or in ways not
evident from examination of the formal documents.  Sometimes organizations perform
review functions for an agreement even when not formally empowered to do so within
the agreement.  This is probably especially true in data gathering and exchange, where
many organizations at the national, regional and global levels have competence, but
might not be explicitly empowered to perform the functions under the agreement; in
practice, nonetheless, they could be the main reasons for an effective review procedure. 
The second limitation relates directly to soft law.  We have tested the framework
described above with a few "soft law" cases such as the FAO International Undertaking
on Plant Genetic Resources and find generally that this framework remains quite useful. 
However, the key issue in analyzing soft law regimes is the relationship between the
(softer) obligations and what parties actually implement over time, and that relationship
must be studied in detail on a case-by-case basis.  Indeed, later work will be examining
the operation of IRMs explicitly in soft law regimes and exploring whether they are
more effective in loose soft law arrangements when compared with hard law.  Note that
it is possible that softer and more flexible arrangements will result both in: 1) more
effective and timely adjustment of the agreement over time, thus in all likelihood, better
connecting the agreement to underlying science, interests and what is feasible to
implement; and, 2) greater willingness by governments to make bold claims and targets
in soft law systems and, in doing so, allowing for an effective IRM to help nudge the
party in the correct direction.  This second point suggests that one mode of effective
6soft law operation could be to keep the standards in an agreement constantly higher
than actual performance.  If so, these regimes could be very effective, but could also be
characterized by very low formal "compliance".  Most analysts instinctively assume
that high compliance is favorable, but this would suggest that under some conditions--
i.e., flexible soft law and the operation of an effective IRM--the opposite is more
effective.  These are possible propositions, but few if any will emerge from the database
because the crucial operation of a soft law regime is likely not to be evident in the
formal documents, even if it proves possible to actually code soft law agreements into
the database (as we have attempted to do).
Although the restriction to formal sources greatly reduces any systematic
conclusions that can be reached from this database alone, it is fully consistent with the
main purpose of this exercise.  Namely, as mentioned before, we are using this, in
conjunction with the theoretical constructs elaborated in a parallel study (see Victor et
al., 1994) to serve two purposes: 1) to highlight important research questions that
emerge when looking in detail at a large number of agreements rather than just the
handful that are most studied by scholars (see next section for some initial observations
on such research questions); and 2) to identify variance in the key variables that are
related to the effectiveness of IRMs so as to improve the process of case selection.  The
more important purpose, is that the database now forms a growing resource by which
the IEC project, and others, can review the existence and procedures for IRMs in a
structured way, across a large number of agreements.
V. Initial Observations
For research questions that come from a review of the theory, the reader is directed
to Victor et al., (1994).  However, the following paragraphs outline some initial
observations and frameworks for further investigation that have emerged from the data
collection effort described in this essay.  In particular, we underscore five broad
hypotheses and questions that could provide the focus for further work on IRMs.  At
present, the IIASA research program is giving most attention to the first, which we have
elaborated into several narrower sub-questions.  Several detailed case study
comparisons are under way on these sub-questions (for more information contact the
authors at IIASA).  Our goal is to test hypotheses and build theory simultaneously; the
questions outlined here have served in part as an initial focal point for further in-
depth research into IRMs.
A. "Organic growth" hypothesis:  IRMs form and are used as needed, and adjustments
over time are driven by changes in perception and need.
7Virtually every regime we examine has an IRM.  This suggests that IRMs might
evolve autonomously, in response to the demand for their functions, further implying
that perhaps the demands for IRMs will be met as they arise.  The main driving force of
further development of IRMs might be the (natural) desire to know if other parties
comply.   However, since other factors are at play (e.g., interests, power), IRM
development can be stopped or diverted.  These could be interesting insights but not
ones that can easily be studied, but it does imply some more focussed questions that
highlight the factors that might affect the origins and evolution of IRMs, as well as the
demand for different IRM functions:
  1. Do the legal formulations of the IRM really matter?  In particular, two detailed
questions emerge:
  a. What role is played by the formal provision for IRMs in the initial agreement? 
If the initial agreement makes formal provision for IRMs, perhaps it will be
easier to satisfy the subsequent demand to develop such IRMs because, in
principle, the need for an IRM has already been formally acknowledged.
However, where the initial agreement specifies the possible form of any IRMs
precisely, obstacles to subsequent development of IRMs outside this narrow
framework may well be at least as great if no initial provision had been made
at all. On the other hand, general provisions for IRMs that were initially
envisaged simply to facilitate reviews of new "knowledge" and of national
commitments, could subsequently also facilitate the development of
mechanisms to review national implementation and performance.
Other characteristics of the initial agreement are potentially important in this
context, such as: voting rules; the character, role, and authority of the
Secretariat.
The policy relevant outcome of research into this question is to identify what
formal procedures and language should be put into the treaty at the outset
versus which of the necessary functions will evolve automatically?  If we find
that the initial structures and procedures do not much matter for the later
evolution, then much of the talk about the need to put these procedures into
place as an early, formal part of an agreement is probably irrelevant.
  b. What role is played by existing relevant precedents or principles?  Even where
there is no formal provision for the subsequent development of IRMs in the
original agreement, the existence of relevant norms, principles and precedents
(that are acknowledged by the members of the agreement) could facilitate the
development of IRMs. Thus, where the members of an agreement are also
parties to other environmental regimes with IRMs, they may tend to be more
8positive  towards proposals to establish similar IRMs in another agreement. 
Further, established principles and precedents are important: proposals to
establish IRMs in an agreement will tend to be facilitated if they are modelled
on mechanisms in existing agreements which the parties see as legitimate and
which the parties are familiar, or feel reasonably comfortable with.
  2. How are IRMs shaped by, and does the IRM help to manage complexity?  Central
to our assumption that IRMs lead to effective agreements is that IRMs offer a venue
for the parties to work through implementation problems, reducing the chances that
the regime will become mired, or stagnate, with no efficient means of dealing with
these problems.  The need to work through problems may increase with complexity,
because exact outcomes are difficult to forecast when the initial agreements are
framed.  
In particular, we are interested in three types of complexity; in each case we ask
what is the relationship between the form of complexity and the demand for IRMs
and the role of the IRM in increasing the effectiveness of the agreement:
  a. Complexity of issue-area:  One important dimension here is the intrinsic
complexity of the issue area or problem addressed by the agreement. In this
context, we are mainly referring to the (scientific or social) complexity of the
processes that the agreement is aiming to limit, manage, or prevent. In
principle, provided that parties are committed to implementing the agreement,
the greater the complexity, the greater is the demand to develop complex
IRMs; the need for customized data- collection and reporting requirements as
well as for defined and well-developed monitoring and implementation review
mechanisms follow from this assumption. Where the issues and relevant
activities are relatively simple, informal or ad hoc IRMs are more likely to
suffice.
  b. Complexity of participation:   Similarly, the larger or more diverse the
participation in the agreement, the greater may be the demand to develop
formal IRMs rather than rely on informal mechanisms. One reason for this
may be because clear and systematic procedures, guidelines, structures for
communication, and dedicated or expert resources are required to manage the
complexity of reviewing implementation by all members. A second, more
political, reason may be that parties could be more tempted to free-ride or
neglect implementation if they are only one of many participants: systematic
IRMs may therefore be established to make it clear to participants that their
activities will be reviewed routinely.   
Linked with the above issue is the diversity of interests and power, leading the
members of the agreement to participate in it. Clearly, the more distinct
9interests a single party has in joining and developing an international
agreement, the greater its commitment to the agreement is likely to be. To the
extent that members share these diverse interests, the regime will be reinforced
and any functional demand for IRMs may be strengthened. However, if the
parties have different reasons for, and interests in, participating in the
agreement, the development of IRMs may be constrained or shaped by this
fact. On the one hand, knowledge that other parties have different interests in
the agreement may increase the demand for effective implementation review,
and may increase the range of activities covered in the IRMs.  On the other
hand, differing concerns and priorities may impede the process of negotiating
IRMs, and narrow the range of issues on which agreement on the need for
IRMs can be achieved.  A ‘super power’ might have undue influence in the
establishment and effectiveness of IRMs.
  
  c. Complexity of the agreement:  The number of distinct issues and problems
that the agreement is seeking to address, and the interrelationships and trade-
offs between them, may be an important factor in the development of IRMs.
Demand for the development of IRMs within one aspect of the agreement may
stimulate and legitimate the development of IRMs for other aspects of the
treaty. Moreover, the sheer complexity of the agreement may generate demand
for formal reporting and review systems.
  3. How does the density of alternative institutions and processes influence the
effectiveness of the IRM?  In principle, if other institutions exist, then the required
capacity need not be duplicated.  Similarly, where there is already a high degree of
relevant transparency and information exchange between countries participating in
an agreement, there may be less demand to establish specific IRMs within an
agreement. And, countries that have already established a number of fora where
issues relevant to an agreement can be aired and reviewed may feel less need to
establish new ones. In contrast, where existing institutionalized information
exchange and review processes involving members of an agreement are much less
dense, the functional need for new IRMs to be formally established for an
agreement will tend to be greater.
Alternatively, where parties are already engaged in dense and active information
exchange and review processes, they will tend to be familiar and comfortable with
them. In this context, they may be less resistant to establishing a new system of
IRMs. Moreover, the transition costs associated with developing new IRMs for an
agreement will be relatively low, and therefore more acceptable.   
The policy-relevant outcome of investigating this question is that many agreements
concern countries and regions that already have well developed information and
review infrastructures, in some cases due to prior agreements.  To what degree
10
should IRMs established for these types of agreements differ to reflect the existing
density of interaction and information?
  4. How do changes in knowledge about an issue affect the evolution of the IRM and
demand for IRMs?  Is the IRM responsive or not, and does it matter?    In
particular, we are interested in changes in knowledge along four dimensions:
  a. Changes in knowledge about causes and effects of the processes addressed by
agreement: in issue-areas where there are likely to be continuous advances (or
at least changes) in scientific understanding of the causes and effects of a
process addressed by the agreement, there is likely to be demand for IRMs to
review new information and to review the adequacy of existing commitments
under the agreement.  Moreover, continuous developments in "knowledge"
about such processes may generate broader debate and political salience of the
agreement. Increased political salience of an agreement (and the commitments
associated with it) may in itself tend to increase the demand for IRMs.
Increased concern in this context may well also generate demand for IRMs to
review implementation of existing commitments.
  b. Advances in knowledge about responses to the environmental problem:
similarly, advances in knowledge about potential and existing policy responses
to the issue addressed by an agreement will tend to generate demand for IRMs
to review existing policies and commitments, and also to review national and
international implementation of existing policies and commitments.
  c. Sources of new knowledge:  New knowledge relevant to an agreement may
come from a wide variety of states, as well as from non-state sources. For
issue areas and agreements where non-parties are acknowledged to be
potentially important sources of relevant new information or knowledge, there
may be increased demand for formalizing IRMs, to facilitate the collection and
review of such information or to allow participation of such non-parties in the
IRMs themselves at some level.
  d. Identifying technical indicators or methodologies to facilitate review of
implementation and compliance:  Changes in scientific and technical
understanding may affect the prospect that parties to an agreement can agree
upon monitoring systems, indicators of performance or implementation, or
data-collection and reporting systems, and thus on developing IRMs to review
the data generated.  Parties’ perceptions of the scientific and technical
expertise required to identify such monitoring systems, indicators, or
methodologies will affect their willingness to delegate the task to expert
bodies, which may be more likely to achieve agreement than an explicitly
intergovernmental negotiating body.
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Changes in knowledge may typically be external to the treaty and the IRM,
although in some cases the treaty and its operation may induce actors to generate
new knowledge (e.g., scientists may find new causal mechanisms through funded
research programs).  Whether external or internally induced, we are interested in
knowledge changes because the IRM’s ability to handle them should significantly
affect the durability of the IRM over time, and in turn help us prescribe better
designs for IRMs.  The relationship between knowledge creation/change and
institutions and effectiveness is also of great theoretical interest since, broadly,
knowledge changes play a major role in the evolution of regimes.
B. Is an IRM more effective when commitments are precise or vague, and how do
IRMs deal with conflicts between commitments and objectives?
We seek general knowledge and conclusions about IRMs, but probably the ability
of an IRM to function properly will depend upon the types of commitments that it
reviews.  Findings here will help us predict (and advise) when IRMs can be helpful, and
they may also, e.g., give additional credence to the argument that specific international
commitments are crucial (or the reverse).  The relevant nature of the commitments will
vary on at least three dimensions:
  a. Extent to which the types of commitments in the agreement lead to incentives
to defect.  For example, where there are incentives to "free ride" the demand
for effective mechanisms to monitor and review national performance and
implementation will tend to be relatively high, for well known reasons.
  b. Specificity of commitments.  Whereas IRMs to review knowledge about the
causes and effects of a problem, or potential responses to it, could be
meaningfully developed in the absence of specific commitments, this is not so
true of IRMs to review and assess national implementation and performance.
This point relates to questions of "verifiability", which are being addressed in
a separate study currently under way in IEC. 
  c. The extent to which the commitments of the parties differ.  The extent to
which parties to the agreement enter into different commitments may affect
the development of IRMs. In part, IRMs may be needed to manage the
complexity of a myriad of different commitments (see previous discussion of
complexity).  In part, when the obligations are diverse, it may not be
transparent which parties are abiding by their commitments, nor easily
detectable whether the burdens and benefits under the treaty are fairly
distributed.  The IRM can help to assure the parties of adequate compliance
and fair treatment.
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In cases where some key principles underlying the agreement appear to clash,  the
development of IRMs is likely to be contested. Under these circumstances, do
effective IRMs avoid the controversy, take sides, or simply report all viewpoints
and hope not to become embroiled?
C. Do matters of standing and access to the IRM affect the performance of the IRM? 
And, under what conditions and at what stages in the IRM process do non-state actors
play constructive or destructive roles?
It strikes us that standing and access obviously matter, but to date we have not seen
a systematic treatment of this issue.  Such treatment could couple work on comparative
law, as well as law and economics, to our research program.  Further, the question of
standing is directly relevant to the ongoing debates about the roles of non-state actors
within treaty systems.  Some argue that access by non-state actors will increase the
diversity of viewpoints which can only lead to better outcomes; others claim that too
much diversity will lead to chaos and blockage.  The practical policy reason for asking
this question about standing is to assess whether some rules of standing are more
effective than others, including whether to grant or deny greater access to non-state
actors.
D. To what degree are IRM functions adequately fulfilled by dispute resolution
procedures?
We ask this question because often much attention (especially by lawyers) is given
to dispute resolution.  Currently we are gathering information on dispute resolution
mechanisms as part of the data base described above, but so far we find little evidence
that IRM functions are largely performed through dispute resolution mechanisms nor
much evidence of the use of dispute resolution mechanisms in environmental
agreements.  Nonetheless, perhaps some comparative case studies will allow for useful
conclusions about the roles of dispute resolution mechanisms.  The practical policy
reason for asking this question is simply whether it is wise to create some (or all) of the
needed IRM functions through a dispute resolution mechanism.  This question could
also be explored as part of "A" above.
E. To what degree do diplomats and individuals within secretariats influence the
effective operation of IRMs?
Many projects in this area find that the outcomes are heavily dominated by the
personalities.  This ‘negotiating community’ might dominate the operation of an IRM
and whether it works.  Bureaucratic and institutional politics are a large part of how
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international mechanisms operate and interact among national and international
agencies.  Institutional mandates, resources, and turf battles will all affect which
organizations and personalities become involved in an issue, affecting the promotion
and blocking of implementation.  If we find this to be true, we might conclude either
that it is constructive to give room for personalities in the process and/or that the
personnel choices to run these procedures are crucial.
VI. Conclusions
To close, we note that this is a study in progress.  Here we have described the
rationale of the study and its connection to a larger research project on the effectiveness
of review mechanisms.  The study reported in this paper is an empirical one--a
structured database of the key variables that are related to the operation and
effectiveness of review mechanisms.  We are engaged in this empirical study for two
reasons:  first, working with these cases and focussing on their review mechanisms
generates many hypotheses that would not be evident initially.  This hypothesis-
generation benefit of working with the data has taken place in parallel with the writing
of a theoretical paper elaborating the conceptual framework for IEC’s research program
on IRMs, which has generated theory-driven hypotheses (Victor et al., 1994).  The
study introduced in this essay is driven by evidence.  Second, a structured survey of
many cases helps to identify variance in the key variables and thus aids the process of
selecting cases for more detailed research.  That research is now under way and is
described further in the IEC research program (IEC, 1994).
The data structure is presented in annex I, and a detailed description of why we are
coding for each variable is given in annex II.  The sample of cases coded to date is
listed in annex III.
We have limited the data collection effort to formal sources of information--
treaties; reports from Conference of Parties meetings, subsidiary bodies or official
working groups, etc.--in an effort to keep the study manageable.  The main purpose is
to allow rapid review of a large number of cases in a structured manner.  However, this
limitation on data sources has at least two serious consequences for the ability to draw
conclusions from the study.  First, even in hard law regimes, many (or all) of the review
functions could be performed outside the regime on an informal basis.  How these
functions are performed will not be evident from formal documents.  Second, in soft
law regimes--which may be more effective than hard law for many problems of
international cooperation--the actual operation of review mechanisms might be
especially difficult to discern from formal sources because soft law is, by definition,
looser and perhaps less precise than hard law.  Yet the flexibility of soft law is exactly
what might allow for review mechanisms to play a more effective role in adjusting an
agreement over time and working with the parties to adjust behavior and
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implementation.  Both of these limitations can be overcome with detailed case studies,
and other research is now under way to perform the needed case studies and controlled
comparisons.  That research has benefitted from this database effort, especially in the
selection of cases.
In the process of constructing the template and working through the data for this
study we have identified a series of research questions.  At present we are investigating
two of these in greater depth:  1) the role of the legal formulations in shaping the
development of IRMs, which is part of a larger study of IRMs in biodiversity
agreements led by John Lanchbery; 2) the role of IRMs in helping treaties to manage
complexity, which is a comparison of the roles of IRMs in the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and in the agreements that control pollution of
the Baltic sea, led by Owen Greene.  A third detailed study--a comparison of the
operation of IRMs under overlapping soft law and hard law agreements, led by David
Victor--touches on two of the hypotheses described here: the hypothesis that where
alternative institutions exist that IRM functions need not be performed by new
institutions created specifically to serve an agreement; and, that IRMs can help the
parties to an agreement manage vague and conflicting commitments.  
Some of these questions overlap heavily with the research questions suggested in
the theoretical study of IRMs (Victor et al., 1994), notably those related to the
management of complexity and vague and conflicting commitments.  More detailed
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revision 21 January 1994
Popular name of the agreement: 
(please define any acronyms)
I.GENERAL INFORMATION
Name of agreement: Text.
Updates to this record: Dates (most recent first)
Issue area of agreement: (four keyword fields)
Intrinsic physical characteristics:  keyword(s), options:
Biosphere, marine, freshwater, rivers, atmosphere, outer space, natural
biodiversity/species, land, cultural heritage, domesticated animals, nuclear,
chemical, biological (i.e., bacteria, virus, toxins)
Impacts to be averted or promoted: keyword(s), options:
human health, ecosystems, agriculture, economy, animal suffering, cultural
degradation, military advantage
Type of objective: keyword(s), options:
preservation (of a resource), resource management, protection (against
harm/disaster), prevention (of a harm/disaster), international military security
Mechanism(s): keyword(s), options:
trade control, control of discharges (e.g., emissions), information exchange,
limits on activity, ban on activity, standard-setting, norm creation/promotion,
research and observation, technology transfer, confidence-building measures
Objective: Text.
Geographical Scope: Text.
Scope of membership: Text
Date and city of adoption and significant changes: Date (most recent listed last)
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Date of entry into force: Date
Number of Parties (currently): Numeric
Sub-agreement(s): Text.
Parent agreement(s): Text
Substantive links to other agreements (regarding objectives, impacts to be averted
or promoted, and mechanisms):  Text
Organizational links with other agreements: Text
Decision making framework for the agreement (organizations and structures): 
1. Supreme decision making body (and occasion and obligation to meet and
make decisions): Text
2. Other bodies (and occasion and obligation to meet and make decisions): 
Text
Secretariat:
Secretariat name (and contact information where available): Text
Personnel (number, approx.):  Numeric and text
Finance: Text
Types of Commitments: Within each field there are two parts. The commitments
themselves and the extent to which participation is required (by "participation" we
intend to gather information on whether reservations, opt-outs, or other devices
(including voting) that allow parties to choose which commitments to follow exist, as
well as information on whether and how these are used).  Not all of these headings may
apply to a particular case. Omit those which do not.




2. Projects (national and multilateral, such as: engineering programs, other




3. Compensation for damage (including liability):
Compensation: Text
Participation: Text
4. Assistance (financial, information, technological, etc.):
Assistance: Text
Participation: Text
Finance (where available, add information to specific functions, e.g., secretariat,
but if more general information is available and should be included with the
record, put it here): Text
II. IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW MECHANISMS
II.1. Sources of Information, e.g., information exchange and self reporting.
1. Data relevant to broad assessment of the agreement (subject, reporters and
frequency, monitoring mechanisms, etc.): 
Data from parties: Text
Data from treaty-created functions (e.g., secretariat activities, monitoring
programs): Text
Data from non-parties (e.g., IGOs, NGOs): Text
2. Data relevant to assessment of parties’ performance and compliance (for which
commitments, reporters and frequency, monitoring mechanisms, etc.):
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Data from parties: Text
Data from treaty-created functions (e.g., secretariat activities, monitoring
programs): Text
Data from non-parties (e.g., IGOs, NGOs): Text
II.2. Review mechanisms.
1. Broad assessment review:
By the supreme decision-making body: Text
To what degree do non-parties (e.g., IGOs and NGOs) observe and
participate? Text
Who can set the agenda? Text
By bodies delegated by the parties to make decisions or recommendations (for
what types of decisions/recommendations, and relationship to parent): Text
To what degree do non-parties (e.g., IGOs and NGOs) observe and
participate? Text
Who can set the agenda? Text
2. Review national performance and compliance:
By the supreme decision-making body: Text
To what degree do non-parties (e.g., IGOs and NGOs) observe and
participate? Text
Who can set the agenda? Text
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To what degree are these functions provided by a dispute resolution
mechanism? Text
By bodies delegated by the parties to make decisions or recommendations (for
what types of decisions/recommendations, and relationship to parent): Text
To what degree do non-parties (e.g., IGOs and NGOs) observe and
participate? Text
Who can set the agenda? Text
To what degree are these functions provided by a dispute resolution
mechanism? Text
3. Recommend or implement responses to inadequate performance (e.g., sanctions,
further study by others, further study by organizations created under the regime,
further study and response by the deviant, issuance of official report, request for
change in behavior of the deviant).
By the supreme decision-making body: Text
To what degree do non-parties (e.g., IGOs and NGOs) observe and
participate? Text
Who can set the agenda? Text
To what degree are these functions provided by a dispute resolution
mechanism? Text
By bodies delegated by the parties to make decisions or recommendations (for
what types of decisions/recommendations, and relationship to parent): Text
To what degree do non-parties (e.g., IGOs and NGOs) observe and
participate? Text
Who can set the agenda? Text
To what degree are these functions provided by a dispute resolution
mechanism? Text




Annex II: Data Protocol
The template reprinted in Annex I requests four types of information:  1) general
information about each case; 2) information about Implementation Review Mechanisms
operable in each case; 3) sources used in coding the case and for further reading; and, 4)
comments.  The bulk of the information is in categories 1 and 2, and we will focus on
those here.  However, category 3 will point the reader to additional sources of
information and, especially, to the formal reports and documents that were used for
coding the case (see below section "sources of information").  Category 4 reports any
comments--we include this because a major benefit of working through so many cases,
especially less well-known agreements, is that many observations about possible
research questions and interesting design features have arisen.  This category is where
those can be noted.  
The data protocol described here is version 3 and has been developed through two
major revisions, each resulting from discussions amongst the authors about the key
variables and, crucially, from testing earlier versions on actual cases.  Development of
the protocol took place over a three month period beginning November, 1993; the bulk
of the coding reported here was done (and revised) between December, 1993, and July,
1994.
General Information
We have coded for a large amount of general information about each case primarily
because some key factors are essential background when interpreting and comparing
cases--it is crucial to control for variables that may be influence outcomes and
effectiveness of the different agreements so that, as much as possible, we can observe
the independent influence of the IRM.  Controlling for variables is a perennial problem
in the social sciences, especially when dealing with cases that are complex and where
cause and effect are linked in complex and poorly understood ways.  Thus here we
report on the major control variables.
Also, the field of general information includes other background information, such
as the city of adoption and the dates of significant changes, that is of general help in
understanding the evolution of the agreement.  We include contact information for the
secretariat because in many cases we have obtained documents from the secretariat, and
for cases that will be subjected to further investigation the secretariat is a logical
starting point for information.
Below we list all of the fields and, briefly, the rationale for including each:
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  o Name of agreement.  Self-explanatory.  Note that this is the formal name,
which may differ from the popular name.  Many legal sources and textbooks
are searchable or indexed only on the formal name and thus including the
formal name is valuable for gaining further information.
  o Updates to this record.  This is a history of changes to our coding of the
record and is used primarily to ensure that we are using only the most recent
version.
  o Issue area of agreement.  We have collected four fields of information
related to the issue-area of the agreement.  Many scholars believe that
agreements covering different "issues" have different characteristics, and thus
we want to ensure that we can keep this in mind both as a variable for control
and perhaps as a hypothesis to be investigated in a later study.  "Issue" matters
for many reasons:  different issues will involve different parts of the
bureaucracy during negotiation and implementation; different issues may tend
to involve different economic, political or social interests or different sets of
actors; and, similarly, different issues may tend to have different structures of
interests and thus result in different incentives to cheat and thus different
needs for mechanisms such as IRMs that might help detect and deter cheating.
These are reasonable claims, but upon investigating what "issue-area" means
in practice, we have found that it varies along four dimensions, and thus we
have developed a set of keywords for each dimension and code for all four of
the dimensions:
  1. Intrinsic physical characteristics.  Many people think that "issue" is
defined physically.  Insofar as we are interested in the issue-area because
it helps us understand the underlying politics, we are skeptical of this
claim that different physical characteristics matter.  However, we code
for this because of its common use and because different physical
characteristics may be related to different levels of scientific uncertainty
and ability to monitor performance--that, in turn, could affect whether an
IRM can be useful in the operation of the agreement.
  2. Impacts to be averted or promoted.  "Issue" might be further refined to
focus on the impacts of unconstrained activities--i.e., the physical and
economic outcomes that the parties are trying to avoid or promote.  This
definition of "issue" is better connected to the underlying concerns that
give rise to an international agreement.
  3. Type of objective.  We have found that in many cases an agreement is
characterized by conflict over the objective, and we have hypothesized
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that these conflicts could affect (probably impede) the operation of an
IRM.  Thus we have coded directly for different objectives, such as
"preservation of a resource", "resource management", "prevention of
harm/disaster".  For example, we expect that regimes with conflicts
between "preservation" and "management" will find it difficult to let an
IRM operate effectively because when virtually any issue related to
implementation is addressed within an IRM these conflicts will surface. 
Also, we expect that issues of management will require the services of an
IRM more than strict conservation or preservation.
  4. Mechanism.  Finally, "issue" is sometimes defined by the mechanism
used in the agreement, and we expect that some mechanisms (e.g.,
standard-setting, information exchanges and confidence-building
measures) will make greater use of IRM functions than others (e.g., bans
on activities).
Each of the above is a keyword field, and each field might have more than one
keyword that applies.  We have coded for all that apply.  A complete list of
keywords for each field is in annex I.
  o Objective.  As listed in the agreement, we reprint or paraphrase the objective. 
The information this provides will overlap with the above keywords, but the
formal description of the objective may nonetheless provide additional
information.  We expect that this information is not useful for controlling the
study or predicting the use and efficacy of IRMs, but it may be a useful
reference.
  o Geographical scope.  We are particularly interested in comparing the roles
and efficacy of IRMs in global vs. regional agreements, and thus information
on the geographical scope helps us identify cases for potential future
comparisons on this topic.
  o Scope of membership.  Similarly, we are interested in restrictions on
membership and participation, which may be expressed in geographical terms
(as above) or in other ways (e.g., by membership in an economic or trade
organization).  We do not know if useful comparisons will be possible but
include this information to highlight possible differences in cases and to see
whether sufficient differences exist to allow more focussed comparisons.
  o Date and city of adoption and significant changes.  This is for reference
primarily but also to highlight agreements that have been through many
adjustments.  One hypothesis we raise in the IRM thinkpiece is the possibility
that IRMs can help the agreement adjust over time; this suggests that a
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comparison between rapidly and slowly changing agreements could be
valuable in elaborating whether those different types of agreements have
benefitted from the operation of an IRM.
  o Date of entry into force.  We want to distinguish between old and new
agreements, mainly because old agreements by nature have been in operation
longer and thus allow for richer historical analysis, but also because there may
be trends in the tendency of negotiators to include review mechanisms in
agreements.
  o Number of parties.  As with information on geographical scope and
membership, we are interested in the roles that IRMs might play in highly
multilateral agreements--where the number of competing interests might be
very high and it could be difficult to handle implementation issues in plenary-
-and smaller agreements that could operate more smoothly.  This is a
hypothesis that might be investigated, and at least the number of parties is a
variable for which there should be some control when investigating other
factors.
  o Sub-agreements.  Many "agreements" result in sub-agreements on more
focussed aspects of the general problem at hand.  For example, by design
"Framework Conventions" result in later protocols.  We enter each of the sub-
agreements as separate records because each controls different issues, involve
different interests, and may include some different IRM components.  This
field and the next are accounting measures to show the relationships between
the records in our database.  Notably, where sub-agreements make use of all or
some of the IRM provisions in a parent agreement then this information is
helpful in identifying the sources.
Further, this field is a way of handling the problem of coding agreements that
have developed or changed substantially over time.  When these changes
result in new sub-agreements or we judge that the agreement is significantly
different (although perhaps with the same name) then we code it again and
indicate so here.
    o Parent agreements.  As described above.
  o Substantive links to other agreements (regarding objectives, impacts to be
averted or promoted, and mechanisms).  As above, we are interested in
links between agreements, and here we code for links that may be made
through the actual commitments rather than a formal parent/sub-agreement
relationship.
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  o Organizational links with other agreements.  As above, this is another
aspect of linkage.  Notably, organizational linkages might include
organizations that operate IRMs or provide some parts of IRM services (e.g.,
an industry group that provides data to the agreement, which in turn uses the
data to assess performance or the general state of the resource).
  o Decision making framework for the agreement.  Here we code for two
aspects of formal decision-making:
  1. Supreme decision making body (and occasion and obligation to meet
and make decisions).
  2. Other bodies (and occasion and obligation to meet and make
decisions).
Because we are interested in how IRMs might contribute to adjustments in
agreements over time we have included information on how decisions are
made.  In the later section where we code directly for information on IRMs we
also note where and how the IRM can provide information to the formal
decision making process.  We expect that the formal arrangements for making
decisions will strongly influence how information from the IRM actually
results in decisions to change the agreement and thus these formal
organizational and legal relationships are explicitly included in our
framework.
  o Secretariat.  We are interested in secretariats because they may provide some
functions needed in an IRM, such as assembling and distributing reports,
providing legal and technical support, and in some instances perhaps even
reviewing reports and performance.  We are collecting three types of
secretariat information:
  1. Secretariat name (and contact info where available).  This is reference
for future efforts to contact the secretariat, especially where we are
contemplating more detailed research and the secretariat has information
that would be useful.
  2. Personnel (number, approx.).  We are interested in whether the
secretariat is large or small because that is an indicator of the extent of
services that can be provided by the secretariat.  The number reported
here is professional staff.
  3. Finance.  As with personnel, finance is an indicator of size and
resources.
  o Types of Commitments.  In addition to the above, we are collecting many
types of information related to the commitments in each agreement because
fundamentally the study on IRMs is about how the parties to an agreement
relate their commitments to their performance over time.  However, gathering
this information in a structured manner has proved very challenging.  Our
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approach is to divide commitments into four types (not all of which apply in
any particular case) based on the types of commitments undertaken in
international environmental agreements, tested against the types of
commitments that would logically follow from different issue-areas discussed
above.  We have then tested these ideas using a very large number of cases
that might be coded to ensure that the structure could accommodate the many
differences.
  1. Restrictions on behavior.  Most agreements require some change in
behavior from what would otherwise have occurred, and most
environmental agreements express this as a restriction against emissions,
resource depletion, etc.  We code this in two ways:
  a. Restrictions.  The restrictions themselves and how they are
expressed.
  b. Participation.  To whom (usually which parties) the restrictions
apply; including information on the possibility of reservations and
opt-outs.
  2. Projects.  Some agreements also call for national or multilateral projects
to be conducted.  These include: engineering programs, development of
action plans, scientific research and data collection programs.  Some
projects such as data collection and exchange will directly contribute to
operation of an IRM.  Other projects contribute to solving the problem at
hand but might be initiated, adjusted or terminated over time based on
the information and advice from an IRM.  We gather two kinds of
information on projects:
  a. Projects.  Information on the projects themselves.
  b. Participation.  Who is responsible for carrying out projects
(usually expressed as which parties and/or collaborating
international organizations); including information on the
possibility of reservations and opt-outs.
  3. Compensation for damage (including liability).  Compensation
schemes are a potentially efficient way to deal with many environmental
problems, but to date they have been used rarely.  An IRM can help a
compensation system operate because fair compensation requires
information on who caused the problem and who has been harmed (and,
in theory, who has benefitted--but, to date, systems such as taxing
beneficiaries have not been used in international environmental
agreements).  IRMs might be designed to provide that information or
could provide it because they are already gathering and assessing much
related information.  We include this category because we are keen to see
if at least a few cases exist to allow comparisons of compensation
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schemes and the potential roles of IRMs in them.  We gather two kinds
of information on compensation:
  a. Compensation.  The compensation scheme itself.
  b. Participation.  To whom it applies; including information on the
possibility of reservations and opt-outs.
  4. Assistance (financial, informational, technological, etc.).  Finally, we
include information on assistance programs.  This information could be
part of "projects", but most agreements include loose requirements for
assistance and only a few actually call for better defined projects-
-we want to ensure that our data protocol reflects this pattern and makes
it easy to distinguish these loose commitments from project-oriented
commitments.  Nonetheless, the overlaps between the two may result in
some coding of the same commitments in both categories.  Also, this
category is reserved for assistance--i.e., cooperation or transfers--
whereas projects may or may not involve assistance.  We do not claim
that assistance, even if loosely worded, is irrelevant but only that these
types of commitments may be seen differently by the parties from more
focussed commitments to conduct projects.
  a. Assistance.  The assistance required.
  b. Participation.  To whom it applies (donors and recipients);
including information on the possibility of reservations and opt-
outs.
  o Finance.  Finally, we have found that it is helpful to include a category for
general information about financial arrangements, beyond those required for
the secretariat, so that the resources for projects and other activities, as well as
their sources and donors are clear.  Who pays for the activities and
commitments has an effect on whose performance should be reviewed to
leverage the required behavior.
Information on Implementation Review Mechanisms
The bulk of our attention is given to coding information on the IRMs themselves,
and what we have found is that few agreements actually adopt a fully developed set of
review functions.  Rather, most have procedures that could evolve into an IRM (or parts
of an IRM), and we suspect that IRM functions are, in some cases, performed by
competent organizations not formally attached to the agreement (e.g., the OECD or the
EU in agreements where the commitments overlap with areas where those organizations
have competence).  These claims suggest hypotheses to be investigated, and we explore
some later in this essay (see "Initial Observations").
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We are interested in two aspects of IRMs:  first, how information arrives into the
IRM process; and, second, how the process reviews and judges that information (and
who can participate in or influence the review).  Our data protocol follows this division. 
In both aspects of the study we have developed a matrix that organizes the information;
in the data protocol each box of the matrix is represented by one data field.  The two
matrices are shown at the end of this annex as figure 1 and figure 2.
First, we code for the sources of information, for example information exchange
systems and self reporting.  We are interested in how information gets into the IRM.  A
matrix, shown in figure 1, describes the types of information and the sources of that
information.  Filling in the rows and then columns, each box is represented by one data
field:
  o Data relevant to broad assessment of the agreement (subject, reporters
and frequency, monitoring mechanisms, etc.).  We first want to know how
the IRM gets information about the general state of the problem at hand-
-e.g., whether it is getting better or worse and whether the agreement is
helping to address the problem--because pressure to change the agreement
might arise from a broad sense that the agreement is not adequately dealing
with the problem.  Similarly, pressure to focus on performance and
implementation of the parties individually might arise from a sense that the
agreement overall is not adequate.  Of course, pressures to modify an
agreement may arise for many other reasons--e.g., domestic pressure from the
public or lobbying from environmental groups--but pressure from an IRM
charged with managing the treaty is likely to arise from more "rational" or
"objective" sources such as the interpretation of data on ambient conditions. 
The data might come from three sources:
  a. Data from Parties
  b. Data from treaty-created functions (e.g., secretariat activities,
monitoring programs)
  c. Data from non-parties (e.g., IGOs, NGOs)
We distinguish these different sources of data for several reasons:  first, data
from parties will tend to be self reported, which is the common mode of
formally submitting data to an agreement; we want to be sure this mode is
distinguished from others.  Crucially, we want to be able to explore the extent
to which self reporting introduces biases into an IRM that diminish
effectiveness, and by dividing the data sources into these separate categories
we can more easily identify agreements that rely exclusively on self-reporting
(i.e., all information comes from the Parties and in the form of self reports)
and those that also have other sources (e.g., from the Parties but perhaps in a
mode where parties can report on other parties’ activities or, more likely, from
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other sources, either through treaty-created functions or through independent
non-parties).
  o Data relevant to assessment of parties’ performance and compliance (for
which commitments, reporters and frequency, monitoring mechanisms,
etc.).  These data are directly related to whether a party individually is
complying with the agreement and/or taking measures to implement the
agreement.  The previous data were broadly about the performance of the
agreement but these data are party-specific.  As before, the data might come
from three sources:
  a. Data from Parties
  b. Data from treaty-created functions (e.g., secretariat activities,
monitoring programs)
  c. Data from non-parties (e.g., IGOs, NGOs)
The same reasons for this tripartite division apply, but for data related to
performance the reasons are even more acute.  The incentives to mis-report or
omit incriminating data will be much stronger when the data are directly
relevant to assessing a party’s performance rather than just broadly relevant to
the agreement.
Second, we code for how data and performance are reviewed.  Again, we are filling
in a matrix, which is shown in figure 2.  Filling in the rows and then columns, each box
is represented by one data field:
  o Broad assessment review.  We begin by coding for the process by which
broad assessments are made of the performance of the agreement, thus
extending our earlier suggestions that the IRM might contribute to the
effectiveness of agreements by assessing and highlighting when the agreement
is not performing adequately as a whole.  Who performs those reviews? 
Filling in the boxes left to right we distinguish between two types of bodies
that might perform such assessments:
  a. By the supreme decision-making body.  In addition to asking whether
the supreme decision-making body performs such reviews we ask two
further questions:
  i. To what degree do non-parties (e.g., IGOs and NGOs) observe
and participate?  These other bodies might be sources of
independent assessments and thus could contribute to the
effectiveness of review if they are allowed to participate.  Thus we
are collecting data on the potential scope for these to play a role
(and whether certain IGOs/NGOs have a recognized role) and
distinguishing it from the formal roles (e.g., by the parties and
secretariat) in the supreme decision-making body.
  ii. Who can set the agenda?  Control over the agenda might affect
whether revision of the commitments is a seriously debated issue.  It
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may be that diffuse agenda control will put these issues in front of
the supreme decision-making body more often, and open access
could at least ensure that when changes are suggested by the IRM
that they are dealt with in a prompt manner.
  b. By bodies delegated by the parties to make decisions or
recommendations (for what types of decisions/recommendations, and
relationship to parent).  It probably makes a big difference whether
reviews can be made by (probably more efficient) smaller bodies (e.g.,
committees) or whether the consent and debate of all parties are needed. 
This is probably especially true when detailed and complex issues are at
stake, and those are exactly the conditions under which we think IRMs
are likely to be most useful--i.e., when it is difficult to make broad
agreements that cover all circumstances and thus detailed interpretation
and oversight is needed to handle each particular case.  In addition to
asking whether the supreme decision-making body performs such
reviews we ask two further questions:
  i. To what degree do non-parties (e.g., IGOs and NGOs) observe
and participate?
  ii. Who can set the agenda?
The logic for asking these two questions is described earlier.
  o Review national performance and compliance.  Next we are interested in
how reviews of performance of the parties individually is conducted.  In most
instances this function, if it is performed at all, might be fulfilled by the same
body that makes general assessments, but the functions that are performed are
actually quite different and thus it could be useful to separate these variables
from those related to broad reviews of the agreement (discussed above). 
Indeed, we may want to investigate whether it is usually true (and whether it
usually leads to effectiveness) that these functions are combined or separated. 
Thus separating them in the data protocol helps to highlight cases that might
be used to study this issue in more detail.  As above, filling in the boxes left to
right we distinguish between two types of bodies that might perform such
assessments:
  a. By the supreme decision-making body. In addition to asking whether
the supreme decision-making body performs such reviews we ask three
further questions:
  i. To what degree do non-parties (e.g., IGOs and NGOs) observe
and participate?
  ii. Who can set the agenda?
  iii. To what degree are these functions provided by a dispute
resolution mechanism?
The logic for asking the first two questions is described earlier.  The third
question is asked because in other areas, such as trade law, many
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questions of performance are handled when they appear as disputes. 
Dispute resolution procedures are well developed in some agreements,
including environmental agreements, and in general dispute resolution is
a separate field of law with well-developed precedents.  (Whether such
procedures are actually used is another matter).  Thus the data protocol
distinguishes the possibility of dispute resolution procedures playing
IRM functions.  (We did not ask this question earlier because dispute
resolution procedures are not directly relevant for broad assessment of
the agreement.)
  b. By bodies delegated by the parties to make decisions or
recommendations (for what types of decisions/recommendations, and
relationship to parent).  In addition to asking whether delegated bodies
perform such reviews we ask three further questions:
  i. To what degree do non-parties (e.g., IGOs and NGOs) observe
and participate?
  ii. Who can set the agenda?
  iii. To what degree are these functions provided by a dispute
resolution mechanism?
The logic of asking these questions is as above.
  o Recommend or implement responses to inadequate performance.  The
IRM could initiate a variety of possible responses to poor performance.  Many
analysts have focussed on sanctions or other penalties.  More commonly used
options are recommendation for further study, a formal report, a (loose)
request for change in behavior, etc.  We are interested in the types of
responses available because they indicate both the ability of the IRM to
generate pressure for corrections and, crucially, its value as a deterrent. 
Detailed study beyond the overview possible in this database is especially
important in this area because the formal authority to take corrective or
punitive measures usually differs substantially from what is actually done in
practice.  As with the above, filling in the boxes left to right we distinguish
between two types of bodies that respond to an assessment of poor
performance:
  a. By the supreme decision-making body. In addition to asking whether
the supreme decision-making body performs such functions we ask three
further questions:
  i. To what degree do non-parties (e.g., IGOs and NGOs) observe
and participate?
  ii. Who can set the agenda?
  iii. To what degree are these functions provided by a dispute
resolution mechanism?
  b. By bodies delegated by the parties to make decisions or
recommendations (for what types of decisions/recommendations, and
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relationship to parent).  In addition to asking whether delegated bodies
perform such functions we ask three further questions:
  i. To what degree do non-parties (e.g., IGOs and NGOs) observe
and participate?
  ii. Who can set the agenda?
  iii. To what degree are these functions provided by a dispute
resolution mechanism?
The logic of all these questions is as discussed above.
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Annex III: Agreements Coded
Table 1. Module 3 IRMs Database3
November 1994
ConventionPlace
(date of adoption)Geographical Scope (No. of parties)1. Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and
Flora in their Natural StateLondon (1933)Regional (9) 2. Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation
in the Western HemisphereWashington (1940)Regional (17)3. African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and
Natural ResourcesAlgiers (1968)Regional (27)4. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Flora and FaunaWashington (1973)Global (120)5. Convention on Conservation of Nature in the South PacificApia
(1976)Regional (4)6. Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural HabitatBern (1979)Regional
(31)7. Protocol Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Flora and Fauna in the Eastern African Region. (Protocol to the
Convention for the protection, management and development of the marine and coastal environment of the Eastern
African Region.)Nairobi (1985)Regional (5)8. ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
ResourcesKuala Lumpur (1985)Regional (not in force) 9. Convention on Biological DiversityRio de Janeiro
(1992)Global (30+) In force 199410. Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to AgricultureParis
(1902)Moribund11. International Convention for the Regulation of WhalingWashington (1946)Global (40)
12. Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna CommissionWashington
(1949)Regional (7)13. International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific OceanTokyo
(1952)Limited (3)14. International Convention for the Protection of BirdsParis (1950)Global (10) -  now moribund15.
Benelux Convention on the Hunting and Protection of BirdsBrussels (1970)Regional (3)16. Convention on Wetlands
of International Importance especially as Wildfowl Habitat (+ Regional Amendments and Paris Protocol)Ramsar
(1971)Global (80)17. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic SealsLondon (1972)Regional (16)18. Agreement
on the Conservation of Polar BearsOslo (1973)Regional (6)19. Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur
SealsWashington (1976)Regional (4)20. Convention for the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild AnimalsBonn
(1979)Global (42)21. Convention for the Conservation and Management of the VicunaLima (1979)Regional (5)22.
Protocol to Amend the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Wildfowl Habitat (see
Ramsar - 16 above)Paris (1982)Global23. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (part
of Antarctic Treaty System)Canberra (1980)Regional24. Agreement on the Conservation of Bats in Europe (set up
under CMS Bonn - 20 above)
London (1991)Regional25. Agreement on Seals in the Wadden Sea (set up under CMS Bonn - 20
above)(1991)Regional26. Agreement on Small Cetaceans in the Baltic and North Seas (set up under CMS Bonn -
 20 above)(1992)Regional27. International Convention Regarding Measures to be taken against Phylloxera
VastatrixBerne (1889)Regional (moribund)28. International Convention for the Protection of Plants (superseded by
Rome Treaty - see 30 below)Rome (1929)Global29. Convention for the Establishment of a European and Mediterranean
Plant Protection Organisation (set up under Rome treaty - see 30 below)Paris (1951)Regional (23)30. International Plant
Protection ConventionRome (1951)Global (81)31. Phytosanitary Convention for Africa South of the Sahara (and 1961
Protocol set up under the Rome treaty - see 30 above)London (1954)Regional32. Plant Protection Agreement for the
South East Asia and Pacific Region (set up under the Rome treaty - see 30 above)Rome (1956)Regional33. Agreement
Concerning Co-operation in the Quarantine of Plants and their Protection against Pests and DiseasesSofia
(1959)Regional (10)34. International Tropical Timber AgreementGeneva (1983)Global (50)35. International
Undertaking on Plant Genetic ResourcesRome (1983)Global (111)36. Convention for the International Council for the
Exploration of the SeaCopenhagen 
(1964)Limited (17)37. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea AreaHelsinki
(1974)Regional (10) Not yet in force  38. Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterrranean Sea by
Dumping from Ships and AircraftBarcelona (1976)Regional (19)39. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by Dumping from Ships and AircraftOslo
     
3
 From: (a) Selected Multilateral Treaties in the Field of the Environment, Vols 1 and 2, UNEP (1983) and Grotius
(1991), (b) Green Globe Yearbook 1994, Oxford University Press (1994), (c) P. Sand, The Effectiveness of International
Environmental Agreements, Grotius (1992).
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(1972)Regional (13)40. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
MatterLondon
(1972)Global (68)41. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based SourcesParis
(1978)Regional (13)42. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution DamageBrussels
(1969)Global (75)43. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for
Oil Pollution Damage Brussels
(1971)Global (50)44. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea AreaHelsinki
(1992)Regional (not yet in force)45. Convention on the Control for the Conservation of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and their DisposalBasel
(1989)Global (33)46. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear AccidentVienna
(1986)Global (64)47. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological EmergencyVienna
(1986)Global (46)48. Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air PollutionGeneva
(1979)Regional (35)49. Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions
or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 per centHelsinki
(1985)Regional (20)50. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on Long-
term Financing of the Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-range Transmission of Air
Pollutants in EuropeGeneva
(1984)Regional (33)51. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution concerning the
Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary FluxesSofia
(1988)Regional (21)52. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone LayerVienna
(1985)Global (134)53. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (as well as London (1990) and
Copenhagen (1992) Amendments)Montreal
(1989)Global (131)54. Convention for the Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical PollutionBonn
(1976)Regional (6)55. Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution by ChloridesBonn
(1976)Regional (5)
